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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2007, Russell Hafer purchased a home and real property located at 402 South 
Lodestone Avenue, Meridian, Idaho 83642 (the "Property"). R. p. 203. Mr. Hafer financed 
the the Property with a loan memorialized in a promissory note and secured by a deed of trust 
(the "Loan"). Id. The Loan was serviced by Homeward Residential Inc. ("Homeward"), 
formerly known as American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. ("AHSMI"). 
Thereafter, Mr. Hafer modified the Loan twice. R. p. 45. The first loan modification 
took place in 2008, and the second in 2010. Id. Mr. Hafer defaulted on the Loan when he 
failed to make required monthly payments under both loan modifications. Id. 
Mr. Hafer applied to Homeward for a third loan modification in October 2010 under 
the Making Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP"). R. p. 203. In March of 
2011, Homeward provided Mr. Hafer with a trial payment plan under HAMP ("TPP"). 
R. p. 49. According to the express terms of the TPP, Mr. Hafer would be eligible to receive 
an offer for a permanent loan modification (his third one) if he made three timely payments 
under the TPP and submitted all the required documents. Id. 
Mr. Hafer made the three required TPP payments. Id. Accordingly, on June 28, 2011, 
Homeward sent Mr. Hafer a proposed home affordable modification agreement 
("Modification Agreement"), provided instructions on how to accept the offer for the 
Modification Agreement, and enclosed a proposed Modification Agreement. R. pp. 54-66. 
Homeward's instructions to Mr. Hafer expressly required that Mr. Hafer sign the 
Modification Agreement in front of a notary and return the signed, notarized agreement to 
Homeward by July 13, 2011. R. pp. 54, 64. Additionally, the Modification Agreement 
stated: 
-1-
I understand that after I sign and return two copies of this Agreement to the 
Lender, the Lender will send me a signed copy of this Agreement. This 
Agreement will not take effect unless the preconditions set forth in Section 2 
have been satisfied. 
R. p. 57. Section 2 of the Modification Agreement laid out acknowledgments and 
preconditions to modification: 
I understand that the Loan Documents will not be modified unless and until (i) 
the Lender accepts this Agreement by signing and returning a copy of it to me, 
and (ii) the Modification Effective Date (as defined in Section 3) has 
occurred. I further understand and agree that the Lender will not be obligated 
or bound to make any modification of the Loan Documents if I fail to meet 
any one of the requirements under this Agreement. 
R.p. 57. 
Mr. Hafer returned the Modification Agreement to Homeward on July 14, 2011. 
However, the Modification Agreement was not properly notarized and was therefore invalid. 
R. p. 45. On or about July 14, 2011, Homeward sent a second Modification Agreement to 
Mr. Hafer by overnight delivery, with express instruction that he sign and notarize the 
Modification Agreement correctly and that it be returned to Homeward no later than July 21, 
2011. 1 Id. 
Homeward did not receive the signed and notarized second Modification Agreement 
from Mr. Hafer by July 21, 2011. Id. When Homeward failed to timely receive the 
1 Mr. Hafer contends that he received the second Modification Agreement from Homeward 
on July 30, 2011, and the accompanying letter stated that the Modification Agreement be 
returned by August 31, 2011. App. Br. p. 2 ( citing R. p. 112). However, the document 
Homeward sent to Mr. Hafer on July 30, 2011, was not a loan modification agreement but a 
new HAMP application offering to restart the loan modification process. See R. pp. 175-92, 
194. The new application Homeward sent to Mr. Hafer on July 30, 2011, required Mr. Hafer 
to submit tax and income information to determine Mr. Hafer's eligibility for an entirely new 
HAMP loan modification. Id. This invitation to apply for HAMP again is clearly not the 
second Modification Agreement Mr. Hafer signed and had notarized on August 2, 2011, and 
which Homeward received on August 3, 2011. See R. pp. 56-65. 
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Modification Agreement from Mr. Hafer, Homeward repeatedly attempted to contact Mr. 
Hafer and his spouse, Sandra Hafer, regarding the Modification Agreement. Id. With the 
deadline passed and subsequent attempts to contact the Hafers having failed, Homeward 
closed the loan modification process because no final agreement had been reached. Id. at 45-
46. Homeward sent a notice to Mr. Hafer on July 26, 2011, indicating that his loan would 
not be modified because Homeward "did not receive the executed Home Affordable 
Modification Agreement by the noticed due date." R. p. 68. Homeward then sent Mr. Hafer 
a new invitation to apply for a new TPP, which included requests for financial documentation 
on July 30, 2011. R. pp. 175-92, 194. 
On August 3, 2011, after Homeward had already closed Mr. Hafer's loan 
modification file, Homeward received the Loan Modification Agreement back from Mr. 
Hafer. R. p. 46. Mr. Hafer did not sign the Modification Agreement until July 26, 2011. 
R. p. 63. Mr. Hafer did not obtain the required notarization until August 2, 2011. R. p. 64. 
Homeward did not agree to and did not sign the late Modification Agreement returned by Mr. 
Hafer (although it invited Mr. Hafer to reapply for a modification, as noted above). 
On August 2, 2011, Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. ("NWTS") executed a notice of 
default indicating that the Property would be sold in order to satisfy Mr. Hafer's obligation 
under the deed of trust that secured the Loan ("Notice of Default"). R. pp. 11-12. The Notice 
of Default was then recorded on August 3, 2011, in the official records of Ada County, Idaho 
as Instrument No. 111062362. On August 16, 2011, NWTS issued a notice of the trustee's 
sale ("Notice of Sale"). The Notice of Default and Notice of Sale were timely served on the 
Hafers pursuant to Idaho law. 
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On December 15, 2011, NWTS, pursuant to its notice, conducted a trustee's sale of 
the Property. R. p. 203. A Trustee's Deed was thereafter issued to Fannie Mae. R. pp. 11-
12. After the Hafers refused to vacate the Property, Fanny Mae filed a Post Foreclosure 
Eviction Complaint for Ejectment and Restitution of Property ("Complaint") against Mr. 
Hafer for possession of the property. R. pp. 7-9. The Hafers then filed their answer along 
with a third-party complaint against Homeward asserting a number of claims, including 
invalid foreclosure, breach of contract, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. R. pp. 13-25. 
On February 21, 2013, Homeward and Fannie Mae filed a joint motion for summary 
judgment. R. pp. 40-95. Following oral argument, the district court issued its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on July 10, 2013, granting summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae on 
its claim for ejectment and restitution of property as against the Hafers, and partial summary 
judgment in favor of Homeward on the causes of action brought against Homeward by the 
Hafers. R. pp. 201-17. The district court subsequently ordered the judgments in favor of 
Homeward and Fannie Mae be certified as final judgments so that an appeal could be made. 
R. pp. 219-24. 
II. RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Homeward on the Hafers' first, third and fourth causes of 
action, based on its finding that, as a matter oflaw, no contract was 
formed that resolved the Hafers' default of their loan agreement. 
The issue of whether an enforceable modification agreement between Mr. Hafer and 
Homeward existed was properly before the district court. The district court did not err in 
concluding, as a matter of law, that mutual assent between the parties did not exist and that 
no enforceable agreement to modify Mr. Hafer's loan was formed. 
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2. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Fannie Mae on its claim for possession. 
The issuance of the Trustee's Deed carries the prima facie showing of compliance by 
Fannie Mae with Idaho's non-judicial foreclosure statutes. The statutory presumptions 
created under Idaho Code § 45-1510 and the finality afforded to a Trustee's Deed under 
Idaho Code § 45-1508 entitle Fannie Mae to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district 
court uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. Silicon Int 'l Ore, LLC v. 
Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 544, 314 P.3d 593, 599 (2013). Summary judgment is 
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Under this standard "all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." 
Kootenai Cnty. v. Harriman-Sayler, 154 Idaho 13, 16, 293 P.3d 637, 640 (2012). Summary 
judgment is not appropriate "[i]f the evidence is conflicting on material issues, or if 
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions." Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 
540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998). "The moving party is entitled to judgment when the 
nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case." Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) 
(internal citations omitted). 
The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in 
their pleadings; instead, the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence 
establishing specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). In 
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order to defeat summary judgment, the admissible evidence presented by the nonmoving 
party "must be anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is 
not enough to create a genuine issue." R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 
P.2d 117 (1990). Further, "[s]ummary judgment should be granted if the evidence in 
opposition to the motion 'is merely colorable' or 'is not significantly probative.'" Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
In its July 10, 2013 Memorandum Decision, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Homeward on the Hafers' first, third, fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth, tenth 
and eleventh causes of action, and to Fannie Mae on its claim for possession, based on the 
court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, no contract was formed that resolved the Hafers' 
default.2 Specifically, the court held, as a matter oflaw, that no modification agreement was 
formed because Homeward never signed and returned the Modification Agreement to the 
Hafers. R. p. 205. It is undisputed that the issue of whether an enforceable agreement existed 
between the Hafers and Homeward to resolve the Hafers' default was before the court when 
it ruled on Homeward and Fannie Mae's joint motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, 
the Court did not err in deciding this issue, as a matter of law, based on the undisputed fact 
that Homeward never signed and returned the agreement to the Hafers. Moreover, the 
decision of the district court may also be upheld based on Homeward and Fannie Mae's 
argument below that no agreement was formed between Homeward and the Hafers because 
Homeward did not receive a fully executed Modification Agreement from the Hafers by the 
noticed deadline. 
2 Respondents appeal the dismissal of their first, third and fourth causes of action. 
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A. The district court correctly dismissed the Hafers' first, third and fourth causes 
of action based on the absence of a contract between Homeward and Mr. Hafer 
resolving Mr. Hafer's default. 
The Hafers appeal the dismissal of the following claims against Homeward: (1) no 
default; (2) breach of contract; and (3) violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. App. Br. pp. 5-11. Each of these claims turns on the existence of an agreement or 
contract between Mr. Hafer and Homeward resolving Mr. Hafer's default. R. pp. 18-21; see 
Masell Equities, LLCv. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 154 Idaho 269,278,297 P.3d 232,241 (2013) 
(first element of breach of contract claim is "existence of a contract"). In its summary 
judgment motion, Homeward established that "no permanent modification was entered into 
because Mr. Hafer failed to return the loan modification agreement by the designated due 
date and Homeward did not agree to a permanent loan modification." R. p. 77. The issue of 
whether an enforceable agreement to modify the Hafers' loan existed and whether 
Homeward accepted such an agreement was clearly before the district court when it ruled on 
Homeward's summary judgment motion. Because Homeward did not sign the agreement 
and the district judge could reasonably infer that Homeward did not intend to be bound until 
the document was signed, the district judge did not err in concluding that the parties lacked 
mutual assent to be bound and that no enforceable agreement to modify Mr. Hafer's loan was 
formed. R. p. 205. 
1. The issue of whether an agreement was formed between Mr. Hafer and 
Homeward was properly before the district court. 
The district court did not raise an issue sua sponte in determining that no contract was 
formed because Homeward did not return a signed copy of the Modification Agreement. The 
issue that Homeward raised in its motion, and that the Hafers responded to, was whether an 
enforceable modification agreement was entered into. The district court was well within its 
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discretion to decide the issue of mutual assent based on the fact that Homeward did not sign 
and return the Modification Agreement to the Hafers as the plain language of the offer 
required for any modification to occur. 
A court can only decide a summary judgment motion based on issues or grounds 
raised in the moving party's motion. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 887 
P.2d 1034 (1994); Sales v. Peabody, No. 41446, 2014 WL 4656522 (Idaho Sept. 19, 2014). 
The reasoning behind this rule is that when "the moving party fails to challenge an element 
of the nonmovant's case, the initial burden placed on the moving party has not been met and 
therefore does not shift to the nonmovant." Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531,887 P.2d at 1038. 
In Thomson, the defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence claim based 
on the plaintiff's failure "to raise disputed material factual issues with respect to the elements 
of duty and breach." Id. at 530, 887 P.2d at 1037. In granting summary judgment, however, 
the trial court concluded that the plaintiff "had not shown sufficient material facts from 
which the court could find a genuine issue regarding the element of proximate causation." Id. 
This Court held that the trial court erred in addressing the proximate cause issue sua sponte. 
Because defendants did not raise the issue of proximate cause in their motion and supporting 
evidentiary material, the burden never shifted to the plaintiffs to provide evidence of 
proximate causation. Id. at 531,887 P.2d at 1038. 
Similarly, in Peabody this Court held that the district court improperly granted 
summary judgment based on an affirmative defense not raised in the moving party's motion. 
Sales v. Peabody, 2014 WL 4656522, at *6. That case involved a negligence claim alleging 
that the plaintiff contracted an infection in her foot while receiving a pedicure due to the 
plaintiff's failure to maintain sanitary instruments. The defendant's motion for summary 
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judgment raised the issues of duty, breach, and whether there was any evidence of a causal 
link between the failure to clean a foot basin and plaintiffs alleged injury. Accordingly, the 
district court could not decide the issue of cause based on a superseding, intervening cause 
theory, an affirmative defense that was never argued or pled by the defendant. Id. Because 
superseding, intervening cause is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the defendant to 
plead and prove this theory. Tapadeera, LLC v. Knowlton, 153 Idaho 182,186,280 P.3d 685, 
689 (2012) ("[T]he defendant has burden of pleading and proving affirmative defense"). 
Accordingly, because the defendant in Peabody never raised the issue of superseding, 
intervening cause, the burden of showing a material issue of fact as to this affirmative 
defense never shifted to the plaintiff. 
In contrast, Homeward' s summary judgment motion raised, and the district court 
decided, the issue of whether a loan modification agreement existed that resolved the 
Hafers' default. More specifically, both the Hafers and Homeward argued as to whether there 
was a meeting of the minds sufficient to establish the existence of a contract. R. pp. 99, 147. 
The Hafers argued that a binding contract arose between Homeward and Mr. Hafer as soon 
as he paid the three trial period payments and returned the executed Modification Agreement. 
R. p. 99. The district court disagreed with the Hafers and held that under the plain language 
of the Modification Agreement, an additional step was required for there to be a binding 
agreement-Homeward had to sign and return the agreement Mr. Hafer executed. R. p. 205. 
The district court did not sua sponte raise another issue or grounds as in Peabody and 
Thomas. Rather, the district court was asked to look at the proposed Modification Agreement 
and decide, as a matter oflaw, whether Homeward agreed to a permanent loan modification. 
See Homeward's Mem. in Support of Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, R. p. 77 
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("Homeward did not agree to a permanent loan modification"). The burden of showing that 
an issue of material fact existed as to the creation of a contract properly shifted to the Hafers, 
and the district court did not err in deciding that no contract existed based on Homeward's 
never signing the Modification Agreement. 
2. By the express terms of the Modification Agreement, Mr. Hafer's loan 
documents would not be modified until he complied with all of the 
Agreement's terms and Homeward accepted the Agreement by signing 
it and returning it to Mr. Hafer. 
"The burden of proving the existence of a contract and fact of its breach is upon the 
plaintiff, and once those facts are established, the defendant has burden of pleading and 
proving affirmative defenses, which legally excuse performance." Tapadeera, 153 Idaho at 
186, 280 P.3d at 689. When the existence of a contract is at issue and the evidence is 
conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to decide whether a 
contract in fact exists. Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,368, 679 P.2d 640,645 
(1984). Conversely, where the evidence relating to contract formation is undisputed and 
unambiguous, the trial court must decide as a matter of law whether the contract was formed. 
See id.; Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Servs., Inc., 147 Idaho 378,384,210 P.3d 63, 69 (2009). 
"Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as 
evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. This manifestation takes the form 
of an offer and acceptance." P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 
Idaho 233,238, 159 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). In a dispute over contract formation, the plaintiff 
must prove a distinct and common understanding between the parties. Inland Title Co. v. 
Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 703, 779 P.2d 15, 17 (1989). An offer "is a manifestation of 
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that 
his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it." Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. 
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Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 237, 31 P.3d 921, 925 (2001) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) Contracts § 24). However, a "manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is 
not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the 
person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further 
manifestation of assent." Id. ( quoting Restatement (Second) Contracts § 26). This distinction 
was illustrated in Intermountain Forest. In that case, the plaintiff argued that defendant's 
presentation of the contract for plaintiffs signature was an "offer" and his unconditional 
acceptance formed a binding contract. Id. However, defendant did not sign the contract and 
indicated that "she was going to take it back for signature and mail [plaintiff] a copy." Id. In 
upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Court stated: 
The undisputed facts in the record reasonably support the district judge's 
conclusion that the presentation of the contract to [plaintiff] for a signature 
was not an offer and [plaintiff] was not justified in assuming his assent would 
conclude the bargain, especially considering that [ defendant] specifically told 
[plaintiff] a further manifestation of assent was necessary. 
Id. at 237, 31 P.3d at 925. Accordingly, the Court held that because defendant did not sign 
the document, and the undisputed facts showed defendant did not intend to be bound until the 
document was signed, a contract was never formed. Id. at 238, 31 P.3d at 926. 
As in Intermountain Forest, the undisputed facts show that Homeward did not intend 
to be bound by the Modification Agreement until it had received a timely and appropriately 
executed Agreement from Mr. Hafer and until it had then signed and returned the Agreement 
to Mr. Hafer. Both the first and the second proposed Modification Agreement Homeward 
sent Mr. Hafer included the provision: "I understand that the Loan Documents will not be 
modified unless and until (i) the Lender accepts this Agreement by signing and returning a 
copy of it to me, and (ii) the Modification Effective Date (as defined in Section 3) has 
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occurred." R. p. 57. Based on this language, Mr. Hafer had reason to know that Homeward 
did not intend to conclude a bargain until Homeward had made a further manifestation of 
assent Therefore, the Modification Agreement did not ripen into an operative offer until 
Homeward signed and returned it to Mr. Hafer. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 673 
F.3d 547, 561 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing that "[u]nder contract law principles, when 'some 
further act of the purported offeror is necessary, the purported offeree has no power to create 
contractual relations, and there is yet no operative offer"') (internal citations omitted). 
It is undisputed that Homeward did not sign and return the improperly executed first 
Modification Agreement that it received from Mr. Hafer on July 14, 2014. Accordingly, no 
binding agreement to modify the Hafers' loan was formed at that time. Rather, Homeward 
sent a second Modification Agreement to Mr. Hafer with instructions for him to sign, 
notarize, and return it to Homeward no later than July 21, 2011. R. p. 45. Mr. Hafer also 
failed to properly accept this second agreement when he did not return it by the July 21, 2011 
deadline. Id.; Thompson v. Burns, 15 Idaho 572, 595, 99 P. 111, 118 (1908) (holding that 
offers do not stay open indefinitely, and an offer is only open for a reasonable time). 
Accordingly, Homeward did not manifest its assent to the second Modification Agreement in 
the mode required by the Agreement's express terms. See R. p. 57 ("This agreement will not 
take effect unless the preconditions set forth in Section 2 have been satisfied." Section 2(B) 
explains that the Loan Documents will not be modified unless and until "the Lender accepts 
this Agreement by signing and returning a copy of it to me."). Homeward's failure to sign 
and return either the first or the second Modification Agreement indicates that it did not 
intend to be bound by either agreement and no contract was formed. 
The Hafers contend that Homeward's failure to sign and return the Modification 
-12-
Agreement cannot act as a condition precedent precluding formation of a binding agreement 
because signing and returning the Agreement is solely within Homeward's control. 
App. Br. p. 13. In order for the requirement that Homeward sign and return the 
Modification Agreement to be a condition precedent as the Hafers contend, a contract must 
have already been formed. Dallas v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 709 F.3d 734, 738 
(8th Cir. 2013) (A condition precedent is "an act or event that must be performed or occur, 
after the contract has been formed, before the contract becomes effective."). Even if the 
requirement that Homeward sign and return the agreement was a condition precedent rather 
than a manifestation ofHomeward's acceptance, the Hafers' argument still fails. 
Because a condition precedent must be satisfied before the contract becomes 
effective-and it is undisputed that Homeward did not sign and return the Modification 
Agreement-the Hafers must show that Homeward waived the condition. See id. "When 
there is a failure of a condition precedent through no fault of the parties, no liability or duty 
to perform arises under the contract. Where a party is the cause of the failure of a condition 
precedent, he cannot take advantage of the failure." Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family 
Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 128, 106 P.3d 449, 454 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Any duty 
Homeward may have had to sign and return the Modification Agreement it received from 
Mr. Hafer was premised on Mr. Hafer's properly accepting the Modification Agreement and 
sending it to Homeward by the stated deadline. Here, Mr. Hafer did not properly accept the 
first Modification Agreement and did not timely accept the second Modification Agreement. 
Thus, Mr. Hafer bears the blame for the nonoccurrence of the alleged condition precedent. 
The federal circuit cases that the Hafers rely on in arguing that a binding agreement to 
modify Mr. Hafer's loan was formed despite Homeward's not signing and returning either 
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Modification Agreement are distinguishable either procedurally or factually. First, the 
majority of cases where the court has held that a TPP or a proposed loan modification 
agreement was an enforceable contract were at the pleading stage under Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure l 2(b )( 6), and thus the courts were required to assume the truth of the 
allegations in the complaint. See Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 885 (9th 
Cir. 2013) ("[W]e must reiterate that the district court granted Wells Fargo's motion to 
dismiss the complaints under Rule 12(b)(6), so we therefore must accept the allegations of 
the complaints"); Wigod, 673 F.3d at 555, 559 n. 3. Conversely, this case was before the 
district court on a motion for summary judgment, and the Hafers could not rest upon mere 
allegations or denials in the pleadings. The Hafers failed to present evidence raising a 
genuine issue of material fact as to their compliance with all of the conditions in the 
Modification Agreement. 
Second, the facts of the cases cited in the Hafers' appellant brief are distinguishable. 
For example, in Corvello, the Ninth Circuit held that a bank is required to offer a permanent 
modification or rejection after a plaintiff has successfully completed a trial period plan. Id. at 
880. Despite following the TPP, the Corvello plaintiffs were never offered a permanent loan 
modification by Wells Fargo. In this case, however, Homeward offered Mr. Hafer a 
permanent loan modification, twice. Both times Mr. Hafer failed to to comply with the terms 
of the offer. Thus, Homeward had no obligation to sign and return either Modification 
Agreement to Mr. Hafer. 
Likewise, in Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff 
raised a valid breach-of-contract claim based on a TPP similar to the one Homeward sent Mr. 
Hafer. 673 F.3d 547. The plaintiff in Wigod alleged that she had complied with all of the 
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TPP's requirements, which the court was required to assume as true. Unlike the case at hand, 
however, the lender in Wigod returned an executed copy of the TPP to the plaintiff. The 
court acknowledged that the lender could condition the permanent modification offer on its 
further approval, and in such a situation there would be no binding offer. It concluded, 
however, that once the lender signed the TPP agreement and returned it to the plaintiff, the 
lender had no more discretion as to whether to off er the plaintiff a permanent loan 
modification. 673 F.3d at 561-63. The court found that after the lender signed the TPP, the 
only conditions remaining were to be satisfied by the borrower, and noted that when a 
promise is conditioned on the performance of some act by the promisee (in this case, the 
borrower), there can be a valid offer that the promiser is obligated to follow through on in the 
event the promisee fulfills the conditions. Id. at 562. Unlike the lender in Wigod, Homeward 
never signed and returned either Modification Agreement to Mr. Hafer. Thus, Homeward 
conditioned its offer ofloan modification on its further approval, which it never gave. 
Indeed, where the plaintiff did not allege that they received a signed copy of the TPP 
from the lender, courts have held that the TPP never ripened into an offer, and the plaintiffs' 
breach-of-contract claim failed. See, e.g., Helmus v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 890 F. Supp. 2d 
806, 815 (W.D. Mich. 2012); Pennington v. HSBC Bank USA, NA., 493 F. App'x 548, 555 
(5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1272 (U.S. 2013). 
B. This Court can uphold the district court's decision based on Mr. Hafer's failure 
to properly execute the Modification Agreement. 
If the Court determines that the district court erred in concluding that no enforceable 
agreement was formed because Homeward did not sign the agreement, the Court can still 
uphold the district court's decision based on Mr. Hafer's failure to properly accept either the 
-15-
first or second Modification Agreement he received. "Where the lower court reaches the 
correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory." 
Edged In Stone, Inc. v. Nw. Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 321 P.3d 726, 731 (2014) 
(quoting Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 64,294 P.3d 184, 190 (2013)). 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Hafer failed to return a properly 
executed loan modification agreement by the clearly stated deadline. Mr. Hafer had two 
prior loan modifications, and defaulted under both. R. p. 45. Homeward offered Mr. Hafer a 
third loan modification and, after Mr. Hafer completed trial period payments, Homeward sent 
Mr. Hafer a permanent modification agreement with instructions that in order to accept the 
proposed agreement Mr. Hafer was required to return the signed, notarized agreement on or 
before July 13, 2013. Id. When Homeward determined that the loan modification agreement 
Mr. Hafer returned was defective, Homeward did not simply proceed with foreclosure. 
Rather, Homeward provided Mr. Hafer with yet another opportunity and sent him a new 
loan modification agreement with the instruction that Mr. Hafer return a signed, notarized 
agreement on or before July 21, 2011. Id. Hafer failed to return the signed, notarized loan 
modification agreement on or before July 21, 2011, as expressly required. Id. The Hafers 
concede this fact, but contend that the second Modification Agreement was actually sent on 
July 26, 2011, and that the Hafers were not required to return it until August 31, 2011. 
App. Br. p. 2. The only evidence in the record supporting the Hafers' assertion that the 
second loan modification needed to be returned by August 31, 2011, is Mr. Hafer' s self-
serving affidavit, which is directly contradicted by the record. There is a document in the 
record that was sent on July 30, 2011, with a return deadline of August 31, 2011; however, 
this document is an invitation to apply for a new TPP, R. pp. 175-95, not the second 
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Modification Agreement that Mr. Hafer had notarized on August 2, 2011, R. pp. 54-66. The 
Hafers' attempt to confuse the date when he was supposed to return the second Modification 
Agreement with the date on the invitation to apply for a new TPP is insufficient to establish 
an issue of material fact. See Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 
524, 272 P.3d 491, 496 (2012) ("A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create an 
issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely"); Barlow's, Inc. v. Bannock 
Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 310,314, 647 P.2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that self-
contradictory and unsupported allegation in an affidavit as to the date that all work was 
completed did not raise a genuine issue of fact when opposing affidavits set forth specific 
and otherwise uncontroverted facts). 
While the Hafers strain to show that the notarization was done correctly on the loan 
modification agreement received by Homeward on July 13, 2011, whether or not the 
notarization was in fact valid is not determinative to the Court's summary judgment analysis. 
In their Complaint, the Hafers allege Homeward told Mr. Hafer that the loan modification 
agreement Homeward received on July 13, 2011, was "notarized in the wrong place." R. p. 
17. Therefore, even assuming the Hafers are correct (which the evidence demonstrates they 
are not), and the Modification Agreement was in fact signed and notarized correctly (which it 
was not), such a finding would still not be sufficient for them to overcome summary 
judgment. There was no binding contract because, simply, there was no meeting of the 
minds. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho at 703, 779 P.2d at 17 (a valid contract 
requires a meeting of the minds). 
Stated differently, the Hafers cannot, on the one hand, allege a binding contract 
existed on July 13, 2011, when, on the other hand, they allege that Homeward told them that 
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the loan modification was "notarized in the wrong place" and, as a result, Hafer agreed to 
sign and send to Homeward a new agreement. The parties agree there was no meeting of the 
minds, and the Complaint alleges as much. R. p. 17. Thus, there is no disputed fact. 
It was for the very reason that there was no meeting of the minds that Homeward sent 
another Modification Agreement. R. pp. 17, 45. That fact is not disputed. Hafer signed, had 
notarized, and returned the second Modification Agreement on August 3, 2011. That fact is 
not disputed. R. pp. 18, 45-46. The loan modification was due no later than July 21, 2011. 
R. p. 45-46. However, Hafer did not timely accept and was thus ineligible for a loan 
modification under HAMP. Id. 
Mr. Hafer did not enter into a permanent loan modification agreement; he was offered 
a permanent loan modification agreement, but he failed to accept the same when he failed to 
return a properly signed and notarized Modification Agreement to Homeward by the 
designated due date. Accordingly, the Hafers' claims alleging no default, breach of contract, 
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fail as a matter oflaw. 
C. This Court can uphold the district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
in favor of Fannie Mae. 
The issue of whether an enforceable agreement existed' between the Hafers and 
Homeward was before the court when it ruled on Homeward and Fannie Mae's motion for 
summary judgment. As shown herein, the court did not err in deciding the issue, ruling that, 
as a matter of law, a modification agreement was never formed between the Hafers and 
Homeward. In turn, then, the court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Fannie 
Mae. 
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Idaho Code section 45-1510(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
When the trustee's deed is recorded in the deed records of the county where 
the property described in the deed is located, the recitals contained in the deed 
and in the affidavits required under section 45-1506(7), Idaho Code, shall be 
prima facie evidence in any court of the truth of the recitals and the affidavits. 
Here, a copy of the Trustee's Deed was recorded in favor of Fannie Mae on 
December 22, 2011. R. 11-12. The Trustee's Deed contains recitals which indicate that the 
notice and default requirements set forth in the Idaho Trust Deeds Act were complied with in 
connection with the sale of the subject property. Id. These recitals are prima facie evidence 
of the truth thereof. LC. § 45-1510(1). The Hafers asserted that Fannie Mae failed to 
comply with the Idaho Trust Deed Act, but provided no evidence, by way of affidavit or 
otherwise, to rebut the statutory presumption. Mere assertions are insufficient to overcome 
summary judgment. I.R.C.P. 56(c). Additionally, as this Court has noted in Spencer v. 
Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 504, 211 P.3d 106, 113 (2009), under the Idaho Trust Deeds Act, 
the legislature did not intend for a sale to be set aside once a trustee accepts a bid as payment 
in full "unless there are issues surrounding the notice of the sale." Such "interpretation 
promotes the legislature's interest in preserving the finality of title to real property." Id. 
Identical to lack of notice issues that the court noted were "admittedly not present" in 
Spencer v. Jameson, there are admittedly no notice issues involved in the present matter. 
Because the issuance of the Trustee's Deed carries the prima facie showing of compliance 
with the Idaho's non-judicial foreclosure statutes and because of the finality afforded to a 
trustee's sale, the district court correctly determined that summary judgment in favor of 




The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Homeward on the 
Hafers' first, third and fourth causes of action, and to Fannie Mae on its claim for possession 
based on its finding that, as a matter oflaw, no contract was formed that resolved the Hafers' 
default of their loan agreement. The issue of whether an enforceable modification agreement 
between Mr. Hafer and Homeward was properly before the district court. The district court 
did not err in concluding, as a matter oflaw, that the parties lacked mutual assent to be bound 
and no enforceable agreement to modify Mr. Hafers' loan was formed. Accordingly, 
summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae, and partial summary judgment in favor of 
Homeward, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of October, 2014. 
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